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Powerful Geographies: Spatial
Shifts in the Architecture
of Globalization
J o h n A l l e n
INTRODUCTION
Geographers, it could be argued, have a particular disadvantage when it comes to addressing
a broad social science audience, namely that much of the readership already appears to have
fairly well developed views on what space and place contribute to the institutional workings
of something like power, especially in terms of its scope and reach. There are certain
time-honoured traditions, for instance, which, it has been pointed out, have shaped spatial
vocabularies, as for example in the case of state sovereignty where bounded territories
and defined distances have long played a part in demarcating the jurisdictional limits of
political authority (see Agnew, 1994, 1999, 2005; Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Ferguson,
2004; Hudson, 200x; Walker, 1993). In contrast, at the risk of caricature, a number of writers
have tended to stress the constant mobility and flow of all things social – from people and
ideas to goods and capital – as a counterweight to settled notions of any kind of authority or
easy territorial fix (see, for instance, Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 1996, 2000; Kellner, 2002;
Ohmae, 1991; Urry, 2000a, b).
More often than not, though, in response to the challenges of globalization, there appears
to be an urge among writers of different hues and backgrounds to merge or piece together
the two vocabularies: to hold in some sort of tension, for example, the territorial impulses
of nation states and other embedded institutions with the more fluid, networked powers
of business and other transnational actors (see, for instance, Held et al., 1999; Hirst,
2005; Mann, 2003; Rosenau, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Wolf, 2004). In this more ill-defined
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landscape of power, scaled-up, territorial bodies may be tentatively fused with the more
fluid, networked activities of economic corporations and social movements to provide what
appears to be a more plausible account of the scope and reach of today’s globalized actors.
Such views of the characteristics of space and spatiality, more generally, broadly represent
an attempt to come to terms with the changing dynamics of globalization, but in so doing,
perhaps unwittingly, they tend to assume its geography rather than problematize it. In
practice, it is assumed that the powerful geographies of the actors involved can be sketched
against, what is often, in effect, a given global backdrop largely composed of territorial
fixity and networked flows.
In this chapter, I want to pursue a different line of thought. The significance of wider
geographies to how power exercises political, economic and cultural institutions, the manner
in which events elsewhere are folded into the here and now, are part of a geographical
reconfiguration of power that, arguably, the tension between fixity and flow strains to convey.
Whilst it is not true to say that the fusion of two spatial vocabularies – territorial on the one
hand, networked and fluid on the other – has led to a more impoverished understanding of
power and its contemporary workings, it is true up to a point. Indeed, the idea that we can add
together fragments of our contrasting experience of global change is particularly insensitive
to recent spatial shifts in the architecture of globalization. It is as if our grasp of such shifts –
the ways in which social proximities are established over physical distances, absent others
interleaved with those present, the global folded into the local and, more straightforwardly,
space compressed by time – has yet to catch up with our experience of them.
Without wishing to overstate the case, the urge to piece together what we know about
territorial and network logics of power represents the limits of conventional geometric
thinking about space and time. It pushes up against a topological world in which fixed
distances and well-defined proximities are perhaps not the best indication of the powerful
ties and relationships drawn between individuals, groups and organizations. Topological
accounts disrupt our sense of what is near and what is far and loosen defined times and
distances; in so doing they call into question the very idea that power may be simply
distributed or extended over a given territory, or that it can be regarded as something
which flows through extensive networks (Amin, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 2002; Allen, 2003;
Gregory, 2004; Murdoch, 2006). Topological thinking suggests that individuals, groups and
organizations may exercise power at-a-distance through a cross-cutting mix of distanciated
and proximate actions, often reaching out through a succession of mediated relationships or
drawing distant others within close reach through the effective use of real-time connections
(Allen, 2004). On this view, the so-called ‘distant powers’ of monolithic institutions or
footloose corporations are rarely that, yet neither can the presence of a close and powerful
body simply be assumed to deliver authority and control. Broadly speaking, power is more
spatially ambiguous than is often recognized.
As I see it, there is no ‘given’ global backdrop against which the powerful geographies
of institutions and governments may be sketched, but rather different groups, decision
makers and organizations caught up in spatial and temporal arrangements that often combine
anything from the erosion of choice, the manipulation of outcomes and the threat of coercion
with the closure of possibilities, the assent of authority and the open-ended qualities
of seduction and persuasion. It is often overlooked that power comes in more guises
than simply domination and authority, and recent topological shifts in the architecture
of globalization have arguably enabled corporate institutions and government bodies,
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along with non-governmental organizations, to bridge the gap between here and there
in ways which exhaust our geometric descriptions of them. Defined territories, mapped
connections, measurable distances, and fixed geographical scales, to my mind, no longer
capture much of the way in which power is exercised in an increasingly globalized world.
In what follows, I first consider two recent attempts to capture what is distinctively new
about power and globality: Ulrich Beck’s Power in the Global Age (2005) and Saskia
Sassen’s Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (2006). Both
practice a spatial sensibility that is not always present in globalization debates. Moreover,
both recognize that a new geography of power is in the making, in which the global is
instantiated in the national every bit as much as the national inhabits the global. It is at this
point, however, that I wish to show how both push up against the limits of geometric thinking
around territory, distance and geographical scale, with different abilities to see beyond it.
After that, through a number of illustrations, I try to show what difference geography, or
rather a topological appreciation of space and place, can make to our understanding of the
workings of power in the present global era. More pointedly, I hope to show why geographers
are more than simply cartographers of power, mapping already given global distributions
of domination and authority.
BECK’S HAZY SPACES OF POWER
Globalization, for Ulrich Beck, has brought forth new spaces and frameworks for acting,
in which the old power-plays between territorially defined actors have given way to a
more open-ended play for domination and authority between state, business and civil
society actors who are no longer subject to the same boundaries as before. It is this latter
group of actors who occupy the new, ‘hazy power space of global domestic politics’
(2005, xi) which, according to Beck, are already at work here and beyond anything
that can be pinned down as either national or international. In Power in the Global
Age, this geographically nebulous state of affairs has come about because capital in
particular, in the shape of individual companies, finance houses and commercial entities,
under an emergent neo-liberal regime is said to have broken out of the confines of the
zero-sum power game set up by the old nation-state international institutional order.
In its place, a new deterritorialized game of power politics has taken shape where the
enhanced mobility of business and capital is said to give it an edge over territorially bound
states.
Meta-power
Under this new game of power politics, globalization, above all, has set in train a means for
brokering power which has altered its conventional bases. For Beck, the new power struggle
has led to a renegotiation of the very boundaries, rules and territories upon which it is taking
place – a game which goes beyond the old territorial, institutional rules: a meta-power game.
A meta-power game is in progress in the relationship between global business and the state, a power
struggle in which the balance of power and the rules of power governing the national and international
system of states are being radically changed and rewritten. It is the world of business in particular that has
developed such meta-power by breaking out of the cage of the territorial nation-state-organized power
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game and mastering new strategies of power in the digital domain in contrast to territorially rooted states.
(2005: 52)
The basis of global business’ meta-power is taken to be its mobility and extensive
networked capabilities; its ability to take advantage of space-shrinking telecommunications
technologies to exploit opportunities wherever and whenever they arise. Beck refers to
this ability as a form of ‘translegal’ or transnational domination, whereby corporate actors
do not so much act above the law or authority of nation states as act alongside them in
their domestic sphere, influencing the rules and regulations by which economic activity
is conducted. In one sense, corporations make their ‘own’ law through deterritorialized
forms of private authority relating to contracts, labour standards, international arbitration
and such. The extensive, diffuse power of global business actors enables them to
‘threaten’ states through their non-involvement, rather than their direct engagement.
The possibility of exit, investment and finance moving to territories where authority
and regulation works in their global interests, underpins their meta-power (see also
Beck, 2001).
Whilst there is nothing especially new about the mobile and footloose characteristics of
business and capital, what today is distinctive about their actions for Beck is the fact that they
inhabit an arena of ‘global domestic politics’ – where the mutually exclusive distinctions
between the national and the international no longer apply. A form of ‘transnational politics’
is said to apply where ‘nation state politics becomes the site where transnational politics is
worked out’ (2005: 113). Global business actors, according to Beck, are able to influence
the outcome of political decisions taken by governments so that their economic interests are
prioritized over others. This is not domination in the ‘old’ sense of command and control,
but rather domination through market usurpation: leaving governments little choice but to
go along with the rhythms of deterritorialized global markets.
States and global business are not the only actors engaged in this new transnational politics,
however. Beck also considers a variety of actors drawn from civil society, in particular NGOs
and social movements engaged in environmental, human rights and consumer campaigns,
for example, which are able to effectively mobilize across international borders to realize
their goals. Strategic in the sense that they are able to raise public awareness around
issues that are packaged as universal and for the ‘good of all’, such civil society groups
are able to exert influence in the domestic sphere of nation states previously held to be
beyond outside interference. Leaving to one side the actual success of much transnational
activism, the networking abilities of such groups to mobilize around and indeed construct
the ‘common good’ underpins their meta-power, according to Beck. It is this cosmopolitan
quality that legitimizes their right to politically interfere in the domestic affairs of states,
as for example in respect of the demands of human rights activists or the environmental
movement.
The sweep of the analysis, if at times a little over-generalized when it comes down to the
actors involved and their powers, does nonetheless point to the increasing interpenetration of
somewhat previously discrete national and international spaces. Governments too, often in
tandem with NGOs or other forms of civil society protest, can also be seen to exert influence
beyond their own borders as they also, in Beck’s terms, learn to master the rules of the new
meta-game of world politics. Instead of the old zero-sum game of power played out within
the borders of the national, he sees the emergence of a more cosmopolitan, positive-sum
game between states, business and civil society where no single group of players can realize
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their goals in isolation from the other. They are all dependent on the powers of each being
exercised in such a way that their particular, often material, interests may be realized.
It takes the authority of states to achieve the NGO’s goal of establishing a world order based on civil
society, for they are the ones who can give this order a legally and politically binding shape. A plural global
area is inconceivable without the existence of strong, active states. Even the strategies of capital that are
only pursuing their economic interests, remain ultimately dependent both on states and on civil society’s
moral pronouncements – this is the only way the cultural and political preconditions for the investment
freedom they enjoy can be guaranteed. The gap between the proponents of the different camps is indeed
closing in this general mêlée of mutual instrumentalization. (2005: 288–289)
In a world of transnational politics, the interests of a highly mobile business community
may have the edge over that of territorially rooted states, but both have much to gain
by pursuing their own goals in tandem. Moreover, according to Beck, all those involved
may enhance their power in the process; states may recapture some of their independence,
for example, despite gains made by business and capital, and NGOs may find themselves
in alliance with either governments or corporations to push forward specific ‘universal’
agendas around labour and environmental responsibilities, for instance. On this view, the
competitive and conflictual nature of power which arises from one side subjecting another
to its instrumental will is less on show than the notion of power as a potential force for
integration and enablement at the global scale.
What enables Beck to make this observation, however, that there is more to be gained by
the actors involved from exercising power with rather than over others, is the belief that
we are witnessing the formation of a dense ‘network of transnational interdependencies’
between state, business and civil society actors (2005: xv). In short, the trajectories of these
different groups on the global stage are thought to be locked together in such a way that
collaboration and domination start to resemble two sides of the same coin.
The limits of geometric description
If this is so, however, the kind of complex cross-cutting arrangements that Beck is at pains to
convey where the global is instantiated in the national world are often lost in a vocabulary of
close-knit networks, global interdependencies and defined territories. The unsettled nature
of the new power formations, the reference to ‘hazy power spaces’and the acknowledgement
that the ‘national’ and the ‘international’ are not mutually exclusive domains, suggest that
the spatial trappings of Euclidian geometry may not be the appropriate vehicle to capture
the new geography of power that is taking shape. The interpenetration of the national and
the global, rather than described as ‘hazy’ in outline, would perhaps be better understood,
I would have thought, if some form of spatial topology were at the heart of the analysis.
Although Beck does acknowledge in passing that many ‘contacts between different locations
in the world are established in the immediate present’ and that the distinction between ‘here
and there’ is losing its constitutive meaning in the power-plays between nation-state and
global business (2005, 139), the logic of the analysis is not followed through to the point
where a topological approach suggests itself.
Whilst it is not necessary to endorse oversimplistic versions of the world getting smaller,
the use of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a variety of global
settings is only one way in which our sense of space and time has been jolted, and powerful
relationships refashioned to take account of the fact that proximity and distance now play
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across one another in diverse ways. Likewise, the ‘lifting out’and ‘re-embedding’of aspects
of social life, where events elsewhere are folded into the here and now, has the potential to
alter how we see the actors of transnational social movements or the cross-border workings
of corporate organizations. Power plays are not simply enacted over flat territories, across
defined distances and measured connections, but knowing that is not the same thing as
being able to articulate or conceptualize it. As indeed Beck’s account of ‘hazy spaces’
reminds us.
It is not simply the rigidity of our geometric descriptions that is at stake, however.
A topological appreciation of power in a global age might also have revealed a richer,
more varied account of power as it is currently practised between agencies and institutions;
that is, over and above that of domination and authority. If there is a new geography of power
in the making, then such equally rigid characterisations of the exercise of power may also
be open to question. Before we turn to that, however, I want to consider a further attempt
to pin down what is new about power and globality which also pushes up against the limits
of geometric thinking, but does so in a way that leaves us with a less nebulous geography
than Beck, although with much the same restricted sense of the different registers of power
in play today.
SASSEN’S OVERLAPPING GEOGRAPHY OF POWER
Early on in Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Saskia
Sassen makes the exacting point that globalization, in its current manifestation and shape,
cannot be adequately grasped through the notion of growing interdependence and the
formation of global systems. She makes the point forcefully because she wants to convey
what Beck fails to grasp: namely, that there is more to the interpenetration of the national and
the global than a web of connections between diverse actors. There is the overlapping mix
of spaces and times to consider too. If this sounds geographically cryptic, what she means
by this is that when the global is conceived as something that is ‘lodged’ in the national,
rather than as an external force acting upon it, we also have to consider the interaction of the
often quite different time frames and spatial orders of the actors involved. As, for Sassen,
the contours of a new geography of power arise out of such interactions, it is important to
be clear about what is at issue.
Assemblages of power
Like Beck, Sassen refuses to polarize the domains of the national and the global, and both
represent the national setting as the site within which the forces of globalization are played
out. Instead of the ‘hazy’ power space of global domestic politics, however, Sassen is
altogether more precise in identifying the emergence of what she refers to as a new spatio-
temporal assemblage. By this, she has in mind a novel configuration of territory, authority
and rights that combines older elements of the legal and bureaucratic system of governance,
for example, with new economic capabilities and norms. Part private, part public, with bits
and pieces of institutional authority, legal rights and territorial infrastructure, the emergent
assemblage which is neither national nor global represents an unstable power formation in
the making. It is unstable not only because different economic, political and legal elements
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may co-exist in novel arrangements, but also because such elements may operate according
to a different temporal rhythm and institutional pace which come together in both enabling
and contested ways. In short, the mix of time-spaces embedded in the material practices
of the different actors and agencies involved – state authorities and jurisdictional agencies,
corporate firms and supranational institutions, civil society movements and transnational
activists – may work to disassemble and reassemble elements of territorial exclusivity,
public authority and civil rights, for instance, in ways that found a new kind of organizing
logic and a new, refashioned geography of power.
Notwithstanding Sassen’s tendency to be over-schematic in her analysis and rather short
on substantive detail outside of the United States, the sense in which power and globality
have demonstrated a more cross cutting nature since the 1980s is, for her, evident from
the altered nature of state power. In opposition to arguments which stress the loss of state
authority in the wake of deregulation, privatization or the enhanced mobility of capital,
Sassen emphasizes the active role of the state in regulating its own withdrawal and setting
up new frameworks of authority through which the globalization of economic and other
activities is fostered. The shift of functions to the private sector and the development of new
forms of private authority governing such things as property rights, commercial arbitration,
contractual agreements and cross-border transactions are geared not towards national but
transnational agendas. A redistribution of power within the state is said to have taken place,
where a number of public and quasi-public authorities start to function as the institutional
home for powerful, transnational actors and global markets.
The capacity to privatize and denationalize is predicated on changes in speciﬁc components of territory,
authority, and rights as these have been constituted historically in the national state. The new privatized
institutional order for governing the corporate global economy has governance capabilities and a type of
specialized and partial narrative authority. That is to say, we see an emergent new normativity that has
incorporated elements of what was once state authority. At the same time, once constituted, this new
normativity of the world of private power installs itself in the public realm where it reappears as public
policy…In so doing, these state institutions reorient their particular policy work or, more broadly, state
agendas toward the requirements of the global economy. (2006: 412)
More pointedly for Sassen, this disembedding of state functions and the growing
authority of non-state actors in the public realm opens up spaces within the formerly
exclusive territory of nation states where global firms are subject to extraterritorial forms
of authority. Parts of global cities such as New York and London, for example, where
financial and corporate actors are said to operate in an accelerated time-space, are seen to
be detached, in partial and variable ways, from the geographically circumscribed authority
of the state. This, however, is not a geography where some parts of national territory hover or
float above it, autonomous from the reach of the state, but rather that such economic spaces
remain firmly embedded in national territories, yet subject to wider geographical authorities
when it comes down to regulation and control. Whilst states remain the final authority over
their expansive territories, the prevalence of such authority should not, as Sassen notes,
be confused with dominance. On this understanding, states are both confronted by and are
part of a new geography of power that does not have territorial exclusivity as its defining
characteristic.
Business and global corporations, as part of the world of private power, benefit from the
shifts in authority to non-state actors within the public realm, but as in Beck’s analysis
there is something of a positive-sum game involved. The actual balance of power rests
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with the new business interests, especially those corporate economic actors involved in
global markets and highly digitized sectors such as banking and finance, yet for Sassen
that advantage comes less from their potential hypermobility and more from their ability to
insert themselves inside the national state as part of a quasi-global regime of flexibility and
openness. Such firms and financial networks may operate according to a heightened spatial
and temporal order quite different from much of the surrounding economy or, indeed, polity,
but to do so they require an active state to relinquish its territorial hold on authority for the
benefit of all, realized in the form of privatized growth and efficiency.
Sassen is clear that the new space-shrinking digital technologies can translate into
additional power on the part of capital in its negotiations with governments, more through
embedded practices than anything technical, but she is equally clear that such electronic
networks only work if they have a territorial base. Near instantaneous transmissions
across financial networks, for example, are only possible if supported by state-of-
the art environments and vast concentrations of not-so-mobile infrastructure. The new
information and communications technologies may be global in scope, but they are not
postnational; rather they are part of new assemblages of power that have reconfigured
state territory and authority, not displaced it. The stress upon fixity is critical for Sassen –
that people, institutions and agencies are place-based – for it dovetails with her previous
argument (Sassen, 1991) that global cities are precisely the kind of economic spaces
which operate globally inside the national. Only this time around, the analysis is taken
a step further by referring to powerful global cities as constituting a distinct kind of non-
geographical territory operating largely according to their own distinctive rhythms and
spatial practices.
The kind of global cities that Sassen has in mind are not the large, cosmopolitan or diverse,
complex ‘ordinary cities’of the less developed world (see Robinson, 2006) which preoccupy
much postcolonial analysis, but the few cities with the capabilities to ‘run’ the economic
networks through their concentration of resources and expertise. New York, Tokyo and
London are the obvious main contenders, as part of a wider global network of financial
centres, but they are less in evidence here than the fact that such centres represent part of a
novel geography of authority comprised of territories without geographical borders.
If the global network of financial centres has led to a greater concentration of power in
selective cities with capital markets, Sassen, like Beck, also notes an opposing trend: the
greater distribution of power within global civil society facilitated by transnational activist
networks. Again the evidence is largely limited to human rights and other social justice
movements, but her claim is that the new web-based, digital technologies have enabled local
actors – and she stresses their local base – to bypass national state authorities by gaining
direct access to other local actors in the same country or across borders. The multiplication
of local transactions laterally through global networks has enabled transnational solidarities
and alliances to form which are able to contest or ‘jump’ the territorial, jurisdictional
authority of states and their legal constraints. In a loose parallel to the unbound geography
of authority thought to be enjoyed by global financial centres, local activists are said to
inhabit ‘microenvironments with global span’(2006: 387), that are neither explicitly national
nor global, but rather assemblages of each. As with global cities, these emergent global
publics are said to operate with temporal and spatial horizons that sit uneasily alongside
the slower, more bureaucratic time-spaces exercised routinely by a significant number of
public authorities.
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The limits of territorial thinking
What is clear about the thrust of Sassen’s account of the new geography of power is
that territorial thinking and, more broadly, a conception of globalization as growing
interdependence, fails to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics of power in play.
The mix of spaces and times that inhabit the national setting are, for her, at the heart
of a new overlapping geography of power within which different actors jostle, co-exist
and interrupt one another to gain advantage. Globalization itself is reshaping much of
the regulatory landscape but not in defined territorial ways where authority is divided
neatly along geographical lines. Rather, in the complex institutional assemblages that
she envisages, authority becomes detached from territory as corporate and transnational
logics circulate through the national frame and emerge as domestic policy. From one
angle, this may look like the blurred, ‘hazy space’ of global domestic politics, where
it is often hard to discern the fluid interactions involved, but from where Sassen stands
such detachment and re-embedding of authority makes perfect sense if it is understood in
non-territorial terms.
Such an understanding, however, requires that we suspend belief in the assumption that
state power and authority are extensive with the borders of the nation, as well as capable of
uncomplicated geographical reach. The detachment of authority from territory also brings
into question the idea that borders are always at the edges of any given territory. For Sassen,
this is patently not the case and she goes further to argue that borders are not so much redrawn
as re-embedded within the national geography, in line with the form of authority under
consideration (see also Sassen, 2000). The cross-cutting spaces of business, corporations,
NGOs, public agencies and solidarity movements, and their different spatial and temporal
rhythms, produce territorial detachments of a kind barely conceivable in terms of exclusive
geometric spaces.
… this detachment today assumes two forms broadly speaking. One is that the border is embedded in the
product, the person, and the instrument: a mobile agent endogenizes critical features of the border. The
other is that there are multiple locations for the border, whether inside ﬁrms or in long transnational chains
of locations that can move deep inside national territorial and institutional domains. Global cities account
for a disproportionate concentration of such border locations; the latter are mostly institutional locations
that assume a territorial correlate, for example, the large concentration of international banking facilities
in New York City. Institutional locations in principle need not have territorial correlates. (2006: 416)
Overlapping geographies of power, where rule-making authorities are detached from
territories and bordered within firms and transnational organizations, take us a long way
from simple territorial logics. They push up against a world of exclusive spaces, defined
networked connections and fixed geographical scales to suggest an altogether different
geography from the conventional global backdrop. In common with Beck, Sassen considers
the global to be instantiated in the national every bit as much as the national inhabits the
global, but unlike Beck she problematizes the geography of the national rather than assume
its familiar co-ordinates. As such, she reaches the limits of geometric thinking around
territory, distance and space; but in terms of sketching a new geography of power in the
making, her focus upon nationalizing the global, so to speak, leads her towards a place-
based account of disaggregated authority. Whilst the territorial geography of the national is
problematized, the networked geography of the global largely escapes scrutiny. Extensive
reach, proximity and presence are taken as givens, as if they make little or no difference
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to the exercise of power at-a-distance. The ‘work’ of the network, as Bruno Latour (1987,
1999, 2005) continually reminds us, more or less eludes her.
To be fair, Sassen recognizes that supernational networks, in particular digital networks,
have the ability to destabilize existing hierarchies of geographical scale; but her concern
is with the new types of territory that they may bring about, not with the potential
transformation of powerful relationships within the networks or their mediation through
those physically distant in space and time. The ‘lifting out’ and ‘re-embedding’ of
authority that she has in mind seems to occur within national settings, not between
them, or between different time periods. A topological understanding of the spatial
shifts that characterize the current phase of globalization would problematize what
happens in between ‘here and there’, as much as the capabilities of the different actors
‘lodged’ in the nation state. It would also enable us to see more than a reworked
geography of authority, and perhaps bring into view the practices of arms length
manipulation or extensive inducement deployed by corporations and NGOs alike, for
instance, which arguably have been made easier by the topological shifts in the architecture
of globalization.
DISTANT PROXIMITIES OF POWER
Both Beck and Sassen are acutely aware of the unsettled nature of the power formations they
seek to describe, and Sassen more than Beck is aware that globalization – as a reworking
of spatial and temporal dynamics – lies behind much of the inconstant landscape. Where
Beck tends to conflate the dynamics of globalization with the capabilities of the actors
involved, so for example speed and mobility become attributes of capital and business,
Sassen grasps the fact that a reworking of space and time has taken place which is separate
from the networked ‘logic’of capital or the changing functions of the state. When Beck talks
about the ‘new asymmetry between rooted and winged forms of power that facilitates the
unwarlike conquests of global business’ (2005: 73), he treats the machinery of the state as
largely fixed and capital as essentially mobile. He may not wish to convey this asymmetry in
quite such a stereotypical fashion, but in doing so he makes it that much harder to consider
the spatial shifts that have altered the architecture of globalization.
As I see it, such topological shifts have made possible a blend of more proximate
and far-reaching practices of power that have effectively changed the relationships
between corporate institutions and government bodies, non-governmental organizations
and supranational agencies, transnational actors and jurisdictional agencies. It is not so
much about which actors have become more or less mobile, more or less networked, as
how certain practices of proximity and reach have enabled a broad range of actors and
institutions to make their presence felt in ways hitherto largely unrecognized. The so-called
hazy, cross-cutting, overlapping spaces of power that have apparently colonised the national
setting may be better understood through a topological rather than a geometric lens. In
much conventional geometric thinking about time and space, distances more often than
not are there to be overcome, territories are made ‘porous’ and global scales are ‘jumped’
by powerful actors (see, for instance, Brenner, 2004; Smith, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2000).
In a topological world, in contrast, the distanciated relationships, direct ties and real-time
connections of the powerful and not so powerful actors come to the fore.
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Powers of reach
A key part of Sassen’s novel geography of authority in global cities like London and New
York is the co-existence of different financial, corporate and government actors operating
within different spatial and temporal frameworks. The combination of old and new forms of
governance, authority and rights that is said to restructure the balance of power between the
different interests is one that works itself out in situ; that is, there is little sense that events or
actors distant in space and time are part of the equation. It would be odd, however, if that were
the case and indeed that the powerful interplay between economic and political agencies
was not, in some way, mediated by those physically absent, as well as by those present
in place. Financial and corporate business, regardless of their headquartered location, for
instance, are likely to be part of institutional arrangements which arguably mix far-reaching
with more proximate modes, circuitous with more immediate styles of power, to establish
and maintain an influential presence in one or more global cities.
Consider, for instance, the significant increase in private equity transactions around the
globe since 2000, but especially in the US, Europe and Asia. Unlike the previous boom in
private equity deals in the late 1980s, this time around the scope of transactions is global,
effectively giving governments little choice but to engage in the process (Reserve Bank of
Australia, 2007). The private equity business profits – from management fee income and a
portion of the incremental gains realised – by buying publically traded companies, taking
them into private hands, raising their operational performance and, after a brief period,
typically three to five years, and selling them on at an appreciable profit (Freeman, 2005).
A key feature of private equity firms is that they finance a high proportion of their purchases
through a mix of debt and funds raised through institutional investors, in particular, banks,
insurers, pension funds and various endowments and foundations. In turn, the equity risk
attached to such ventures is often sold on by investors, multiplying the number of economic
actors involved. For example, a private equity takeover of a major UK high street chain in
2007 led by US investors, KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts), witnessed a catalogue of banks –
Citigroup, Barclays Capital, Deutsche Bank, J P Morgan Cazenove, Bank ofAmerica, Royal
Bank of Scotland, UniCredit and Merrill Lynch – involved in the syndication of risk and the
debt financing arrangements for the purchase (Financial Times, 2007a). Consortia, trusts,
joint partnerships are the norm in this type of high investment economic activity, with KKR
involved with the world’s largest private equity firm, Blackstone, in purchases worldwide,
together with Europe’s largest fund, CVC Capital Partners. The latter has offices spread
across Europe and Asia, Blackstone has recently opened offices in London, Hamburg and
Mumbai and KKR has backed acquisitions across Europe, Australia and Asia. Together,
with other significant funds such as the Carlyle Group, Terra Firma, Texas Pacific, Permira
and the Apollo Group, a complex geography of financial networking and investment has
enabled the mobilization of funds over space to be used to acquire a range of domestic
assets from catering outlets, water utilities and transport infrastructure to manufacturing,
drug and healthcare companies. The ability to manage and control funds at a distance in
this way is a form of distanciated power, in Anthony Giddens’ (1984) sense of the term,
but it is the reach into homely domestic spaces which gives this type of capital its powerful
presence.
Much of what private equity groups do involves little more than long-established financial
engineering, using debt to lever up profitable returns, rather than the techniques of anything
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resembling ‘fast capitalism’. Practically, such groups act as intermediaries, folding in
actors distant in space and time by enrolling them into financial arrangements that offer
the inducement of substantial returns (Fenn, Liang and Prowse, 1995). The key to this
arrangement, following Latour (1996), is the ability to ‘hook up’ others to the process of
circulation, to draw others into the network of meanings in such a way that it extends and
reproduces itself through spaces and time.As such, it involves a mediated exercise of power,
where distances are bridged by the successive enrolment of actors to form something akin to a
single will. Holding the arrangement together is a more tenuous affair than often understood,
requiring powers of inducement and persuasion on the part of private equity firms, but what
gives them their extensive reach inside domestic spaces, as Sassen perceptively observed,
is the ability to work through institutional ‘borders’, at locations well within the national
domain.
The consortia, and their allied banks, although made up of economic actors drawn from
far and wide, are able to be more or less present in the here and now of western economies.
The lifting out of economic relations from one context to another made possible by an
extended circuit of institutional actors at a distance provides a kind of arm’s length reach
into national economies, but the ability to establish near instantaneous reach through a
variety of telecommunication and media technologies also gives the consortia the added
possibility of exercising an influential presence in real time. The point is less about speed and
hypermobility as it is about the reduction of uncertainty and the leverage that co-presence can
afford when structuring a deal and working with different interest groups and government
bodies. Simultaneous exchange at ever greater distances has nothing to do with power
moving faster, it is merely a medium that enables certain practices and not others, such as
the inducement and persuasion of governments and shareholders that their interests are, for
the present at least, best served by private equity deals (see Blackburn, 2006).
Government reaction to the increased number of private equity acquisitions in the UK for
example, where the value of such deals exceeded 89 billion dollars in 2006 (Thomson
Financial, 2007), has largely focussed on the perceived efficiency gains that private
ownership can bring, tempered by a concern for potential job losses. When companies are
taken out of public scrutiny and the short-term requirements of shareholder accountability,
the potential efficiency gains realized through the restructuring of management and labour
provide a strong inducement for public authorities to back the ownership changes, especially
where they involve newly privatized setups as is the case with many infrastructure deals. In
any such interplay of forces, however, where actors are mobilized and positioned through
particular practices, the possibility of manipulation as much as inducement is always in play.
The strong reaction from trades union bodies in the UK to increased private equity deals,
for instance, has been to draw attention to the manipulative ploys exercised by private
equity firms, where their excessive fees are concealed from view and potential returns
exaggerated. If the erosion of job security that private deals foster is the price to be paid for
greater economic efficiency, the trades unions have questioned whether the returns from the
performance of private equity are in fact any higher over time than that of publically quoted
companies (Financial Times, 2007b). Indeed, most studies suggest that the returns over
time are roughly similar, although it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture (Samuelson,
2007).
In Beck’s analysis, then, what may appear to be a positive-sum game between governments
and global private equity consortiums, where the goals of both are realized in tandem,
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may perhaps be better understood as an instance of ‘organizational outflanking’. In Michael
Mann’s (1986) sense of this term, governments comply not because they perceive their
interests to be shared but because they are so embedded in existing economic arrangements
that they have little choice other than to go along with the private equity option – for the
present, that is. Put another way, government bodies are outflanked by a form of global
capital in this instance because the sheer scale of the private equity business holds the
potential to ‘rejuvenate’ a large number of sizeable companies and, as such, cannot be
simply sidelined. In the UK, the prospect of a more dynamic and efficient business sector
gives private equity the edge over government, not the fact that the later is believed to be
territorially ‘rooted’ in its capabilities.
More to the point, in this scenario, inducement and manipulation can be seen to play
across one another in an arrangement that involves far reaching powers intersecting with
more proximate modes. As a cameo of the new geography of power in the making, private
equity operates neither as a force external to the nation state nor one internal to its boundaries,
but rather one with powers of reach that enable them to make themselves present in different
economies through mediated and real time connections. Power may be believed to be seeping
away from states, but public and private authorities are also part of a topological world
that is shifting in terms of its global architecture. They too, through the newly privatized
institutional order described by Sassen, are engaged directly with transnational institutions
and their counterparts in other nation states. The changing relationship between government,
business and civil society actors, the regulation and enforcement of standards that takes
place between them in different national contexts, owes less in this respect to the assumed
capabilities of each and rather more to the expanded workings and practices of power made
possible by a shift in the spatial and temporal dynamics of globalization.
Powers of connection
It is not only the relationship between government and business that has taken particular
twists and turns as a new geography of power is fashioned; NGOs, and civil society actors
are also part of the topological equation. For Beck, as well as Sassen, the growth of social
movements – networks of actors in environmental, feminist, human rights, labour and
consumer alliances – have tilted the balance of power. The ability to mobilize across borders,
to conduct transnational campaigns through extensive activist networks and to ‘jump’ the
territorial, jurisdictional authority of states, has, it would appear, empowered many across
the globe who previously found themselves constrained in some kind of zero-sum game
(see, for example, Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Such empowerment, in part, is viewed as
a product of newly forged connections: the ability to span the globe from a local base or to
‘jump’ from the local to the global and back again (McDonald, 2006). Obviously the new
media and communications technologies have played a significant part in facilitating such
networked mobilisations, but such connectivity in and of itself fails to capture quite how
transnational activists have been able to exert an influence often way beyond their means.
The power of connections amounts to more than just lines on a map and speaks to the ways
in which NGOs and civil society campaigners have been able to make ‘publics’ present
across a range of global social justice issues.
The mobilization of distant and dispersed ‘publics’ around issues of global justice and
the ability to bring pressure to bear upon governments and corporations in various parts of
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the world, but especially in the wealthier parts of Europe, Asia and the US, has been greatly
enhanced by the topological shifts in global architecture. The ability, for instance, to link the
actions of governments or corporations directly to the abuse of poor communities elsewhere
in the world or to issues faced collectively such as climate change, ecological disasters,
food risks and sweatshop exploitation, is, in practice, a topological tactic. The stress upon
practice is deliberate, because the connections between citizen and environmental tragedy
or between consumer and corporate exploitation on the far side of the globe have to be
made – they are not given.
In many consumer campaigns, for example, civil society movements have been able to
draw closer events such as sweatshop exploitation in far off locations by fixing directly upon
company logos (in the case of sweatshop exploitation, Nike, Gap,Adidas, Puma and Reebok
have all figured) and linking the actions of branded retailers directly to abuse overseas. In
doing so, they established an immediate connection between exploitation ‘over there’ and
corporate decisions ‘back home’. More pointedly, NGOs and campaigning groups were able
effectively to erase from view the majority of global supply chain connections that separate
factory workers from consumers: the buyers and suppliers, trading companies and sourcing
agents, subcontractors and subassembly firms. In other words, they cut out the very agencies
and ties which comprise much of the global market machinery that frequently passes for
economic interdependence. The power of connection in this instance, therefore, derives
from the ability of activists to dissolve, not traverse, the gap between ‘near’ and ‘far’ by
lifting out exploitation and re-embedding it among those affluent consumers who benefit
from it (see Allen, 2006).
Moreover, by framing the issue of sweatshop exploitation as one that involves us all,
NGOs, like Oxfam and Christian Aid, used the fact of ‘connection’ to oblige consumers
to take responsibility for events elsewhere. By virtue of being part of an economic system
which reproduces exploitation, western consumers were made to feel responsible (but not
to blame) for the harm and injustice meted out in their name on factory floors distant in
both space and time (see Young, 2003, 2004). The success of this mediated exercise of
power, whereby NGOs enrolled consumers to confront retail corporations directly with the
consequences of their (indirect) actions, has however less to do with solidarities produced
through the new telecommunications technologies and rather more to do with the ability of
social movements to persuade, manipulate and influence action at-a-distance.
If folding in events directly from elsewhere is a key tactic adopted by transnational
activists, the reaction of those targeted, corporations and government agencies in the main,
has been to distance themselves from abuses elsewhere. The alliances between NGOs and
states or business and civil society movements that Beck sees as critical to the realisation
of mutual goals is exemplified by the forms of corporate responsibility recently adopted
by many global companies operating in sensitive environmental and consumer-orientated
fields (see Hartman et al., 2003). What may appear as an exercise of power with rather than
over others, however, may from another angle look like a displacement of responsibility
onto others, as liabilities are offset or obligations contracted out. In a topological world,
the kind of connections which underpin economic interdependence can be stretched just
as easily as they can be compressed or erased. The ability of corporations in particular to
extend events in time and space, although another instance of distanciated power, is one that
involves the mobilization of resources to push events further away rather than draw them
closer. The corporate codes of conduct and the extensive monitoring of overseas factory
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outlets conducted by the retail giants was certainly seen in this light by the NGOs involved
in the antisweatshop movement (see Jenkins, et al., 2002).
All of this, it seems to me, makes it difficult to convey the interplay of forces as merely
one of domination, authority and resistance, whether seen as transnational or otherwise.
Corporate business may attempt to dominate much of what happens elsewhere through
their ability to close down choices and constrain possibilities, as often appears to be the
case with overseas factories and global supply chains, but it can also be seen to engage in
manipulation, persuasion and inducement every bit as much as NGOs and governments do.
The ability to do so, on the part of all parties, is enhanced by the topological shifts that
have given shape to globalization, although the different registers of power in play are not
reducible to them.
Indeed, a topological appreciation of power in the contemporary global era would have
drawn attention to the fact that neither social justice movements nor any other type of
global actor actually ‘jump’ scale, they merely connect more or less directly with others
elsewhere. Distanciated relationships, direct ties and real-time connections displace the
notion of geometric scale and the idea that actors move up and down them, from the local to
the global and back. When the global union, UNI, which draws its representation from 150
countries, used the 2007 Davos economic forum in Switzerland as the site from which to
lobby against the ‘corporate greed’of private equity firms, it did not ‘jump’scale as much as
make a direct connection to the world’s media outlets. How successful it was in constructing
a dispersed ‘public’ around its political goal is a debatable issue, but the intervention itself
assumed a topological world as a matter of course; that is, something that has been with us
for a while, even if not fully recognized.
CONCLUSION
In making the case for a topological appreciation of the workings of power in the present
global era, the sub text of my argument is the fact that the topological shifts that I have
outlined are more widespread than many would appear to acknowledge. It is not that the use
of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a variety of global settings
is a particularly novel observation or that the compression of space by time is unknown by
either Beck or Sassen. It is just that the label topological is rarely used to describe such
spatial and temporal shifts. Why this should be so I am not quite sure, but it is evident to me
that the writings of both Beck and Sassen do push up against the limits of geometric thinking
around territory, distance and geographical scale. The loosening of defined distances and
times that appears at various moments in their work, however, is not taken a step further
and incorporated into their analyses of the reconfiguration of power and authority. Beck’s
hazy spaces of power remain that and Sassen’s more insightful spatio-temporal assemblages
of power only ever shape the domestic setting. The new geography of power that Sassen
speaks about is not especially global.
The powerful geographies that I have sketched in the final section separate out the
reworking of the spatial and temporal dynamics of globalization from the so-called territorial
and mobile characteristics of states, civil society actors and the business world. In doing
so, I believe that it becomes easier to grasp the difference that such dynamics make
to the powers of reach and connection variously exercised by economic corporations,
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government authorities and social movements. The ability to draw distant others within
close reach or construct the close at hand at-a-distance are indicative of the cross-cutting
mix of distanciated and proximate actions that is central to an understanding of the global
workings of power today. If little else, such a topology of power relations helps to show
why a focus upon how power is exercised and practised can be more useful than one fixated
on the territorial and networked capabilities of all those involved.
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